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iAUDIT! - Near the end of World War I, the French Army began working on plans for a heavy tank that could cross wide trenches and break through strong fortifications. Plans for the tank were completed just as the war ended. Confident (mistakenly) in the protection of the burgeoning Maginot Line, the French Army wanted to cancel development of the heavy tank; it had no use for a trench-crossing behemoth and wanted light tanks for supporting infantry. Yet leaders in the Ministry of Defense insisted on continuing the project, and in 1921, French manufacturers produced the Char 2C, the largest and heaviest tank ever to enter production. Ten tanks would be completed.
The Char 2C was enormous; it weighed 76 tons, was almost 34 feet long and nearly 14 feet high. By comparison, the modern US Abrams M1A2 weighs 71 tons and is 26 feet long. The Char 2C was obsolete before it lumbered off the assembly line. The tank was made for a war that had ended three years before it was produced. It was slow--about nine miles per hour at top speed. Its height made it an obvious target on the battlefield, and its short-barreled 75mm gun was useless against other tanks. It was meant to be a so-called “breakthrough” tank that would smash through fortifications so infantry that followed could exploit the break in enemy lines. The tank was built for the trench warfare common during World War I. Unfortunately, it soon became obvious warfare was becoming more mobile. The Char 2C was too slow to strike out on its own as part of an armored attack and its armor was too thin for close-in fighting against other tanks. Yet, despite its many flaws, the tank was in service for almost 20 years. Defense Ministry officials believed it projected an image of a powerful military, and the tank featured prominently in propaganda newsreels and in parades.
When World War II broke out, newsreels showed the Char 2C breaking through walls and knocking down trees as if it were unstoppable. Except it never was anywhere near the front. French Army commanders knew it was useless against faster and more powerful German armor, so it was used purely for propaganda .When the German Army rampaged across France in June 1940, all 10 Char 2C’s were sabotaged by their crews and abandoned. None survived the war.
What can the tale of the Char 2C teach us about LA’s homelessness programs? More than you might think. The French Ministry of Defense funded the project despite the military’s opposition because the armament industry wanted to make money, and the Defense Ministry liked the power the mammoth tank projected. In other words, it was a money-making public relations tool. Compare that to many homelessness programs. They’re not effective and are immensely expensive. Dozens of large nonprofit organizations make hundreds of millions of dollars per year providing few, if any, services to the unhoused. Some comparisons might help to make the connection:
The Char 2C was obsolete: it was a solution to a problem that no longer existed. Homelessness program managers continue to support Housing First policies despite three decades of failure. Housing First was developed before the opioid and methamphetamine epidemics flooded the streets with people trapped in addiction, and before untreated mental illness was considered a matter of “personal agency”. In Los Angeles, no more than a few thousand people have been permanently housed at a cost of between $2 billion and $4 billion per year. Many of those people fall back into homelessness after a few years due to a lack of support services, and may be counted again as sheltered or housed as they recycle through the system.
The Char 2C benefited its manufacturers, and no one else: French Army leaders did not want it, and it served no purpose as the era of mobility overtook static trench warfare. But millions of francs were riding on its development, and the Ministry of Defense, a politically-driven agency, insisted on its creation to benefit its manufacturers. In LA, the current homelessness structure primarily benefits a small number of corporate nonprofits, whose revenues and assets have skyrocketed over the past few years. That revenue must be guarded and guaranteed regardless of its limited benefit. That is why its so important for nonprofits and local leaders who support them need to control the narrative around homelessness, as I wrote here and here.
The Char 2C looked impressive but was functionally useless: The tank was massive; it contained two distinct fighting compartments separated by an engine room, plus a three-person forward turret and a smaller rear turret housing a machine gun. It had a crew of 12 (an Abrams has four crew members). The tank bristled with four machine guns and a 75 mm canon in the main turret. It could plow through thick walls, knock down mature trees, and span wide trenches. Yet it served no purpose. Its armor was too thin to withstand anything more than small arms fire, and its low velocity canon was ineffective against other tanks. It was nothing more than an expensive and colossal public relations tool.
Let’s compare the Char 2C’s uselessness with Mayor Bass’ signature Inside Safe program. According to the City Controller, Inside Safe has cost $323,452,150 and housed 1,431 people, at a cost of $226,030 per person housed. A December 2024 press release from the Mayor’s Office trumpeted the program’s success getting thousands of people off the streets. Yet just a day later, the City Controller issued a report showing a shelter system in complete disarray. Bed occupancy rates rarely exceed 80 percent, and fewer than 20 percent of shelter clients progress to permanent housing. In addition, the Controller’s site shows 2,344 Inside Safe clients fell back into homelessness, about 1.6 times more than the number housed. Yet the Mayor and her staff continue to insist Inside Safe has been an unqualified success. In reality, it has been nothing more than a flashy program Mayor Bass can trot out at press opportunities to claim success.
When real hostilities broke out and Germany invaded France, French army officials quickly hustled its lumbering outdated tanks away from the real fighting. They knew the Char 2C brought no value to the battlefield. In LA, local officials refuse to admit their programs aren’t working. They continue to support failed policies and spend millions in taxpayer dollars to avoid accountability. At least French commanders had the decency and common sense to save the lives of their soldiers by moving the tanks away from the front. In Los Angeles, officials seem willing to leave thousands on the streets, where more than six die each night, as long as they can maintain the illusion of success.
(Tim Campbell is a longtime Westchester resident and veteran public servant who spent his career managing a municipal performance audit program. Drawing on decades of experience in government accountability, he brings a results-driven approach to civic oversight. In his iAUDIT! column for CityWatchLA, Campbell emphasizes outcomes over bureaucratic process, offering readers clear-eyed analyses of how local programs perform—and where they fall short. His work advocates for greater transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness in Los Angeles government.)
