Comments
NICK’S VIEW - California’s High‑Speed Rail (HSR) project is the largest public works effort in the state’s history. It has long been envisioned as a way to link California’s major regions with a "bullet" train to support economic growth, create jobs, clean the environment and relieve traffic congestion.
Despite three official beginnings, today it remains off track.
The project effectively had three starting points: 1996, when the agency behind it was created; 2008, when voters approved it; and 2015, when construction began. Yet that construction included no track, only viaducts, bridges, and earthworks spanning about 119 miles from Madera to north of Bakersfield.
After its official authorization in 2015, it embarked on a ten-year odyssey—a long and complicated journey, hindered by delays, budget pressures, and persistent public skepticism. As was predictable, exploding costs were just one reason: in 2008, the original cost was established at $33 billion. According to the California High‑Speed Rail Authority’s (CHSRA) construction update, the current cost has increased seven times for Phase I.
Moving forward is not possible without funding. The project has lost about $4 billion in federal support and now depends largely on state cap‑and‑trade revenue, which brings in about $1 billion a year, money that would have been available for transit, housing and other programs, along with renewed and delusionary efforts to attract private investment. Securing funding through private sources has failed to produce valid partners.
Another proposal to obtain funding is an attempt to divert local tax growth through a legally dubious scheme that was attacked by ten mayors.
" This proposal in the 2026 Draft Business Plan is fiscally reckless, legally vulnerable, and fundamentally unfair to the communities expected to host High-Speed Rail facilities. It would weaken local governments, destabilize public services, and undermine constitutional protections that California voters have repeatedly affirmed. Simply put: the state cannot solve a state funding problem by raiding local tax bases," wrote Fresno Mayor Jerry Dyer along with nine other mayors in a letter addressed
Sadly, delays have also become a major barrier to progress, driven by governance failures, planning errors, waste, management breakdowns, and the lack of both project design and the institutional structure needed to carry it out.
Using current bottom-up methodology, costs of the full Phase I scope are estimated to have increased to $231.3 billion, based on figures from the latest 2025–2026 reports and the High‑Speed Rail Authority’s own business plan. Phase I is the first full build‑out of the statewide system, running 494 miles, the core system voters understood when they approved Proposition 1A in 2008.
According to the Orange County Register, there is no reason to think the project can be delivered even at that cost. A new report from the nonpartisan Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) to state lawmakers found the rail authority’s latest plan “lacks transparency,” fails to properly explain its intent to build train stations in locations other than previously planned, and cannot identify where the money it needs will come from.
Unfortunately, the ethically corrupt state legislature`s response to LAO` findings is to allow CHSRA to obfuscate and hide data from the public.
California Assembly Bill 1608 would allow the CHSRA to withhold records from the public that the Inspector General believes would "reveal weaknesses" if publicly disclosed.
Adding to the project’s financial troubles, the Trump Administration formally terminated about $4 billion in unspent federal funding last July, citing severe delays, lack of planning cost overruns, and failure to meet grant obligations.
So, how the CHSRA is attempting to obfuscate the true costs? The agency is proposing to stop the rail six miles short of downtown Bakersfield and three miles outside of downtown Merced. As part of cost savings, the agency proposes to lay one main track instead of two, which would force trains traveling in one direction to pull over on sidings to let trains from the other direction pass., making the "bullet train" an illusion.
None of this was surprising. More than thirty years of my volunteer oversight of several city, county, and state infrastructure projects, gave me the insider`s perspective to understand the key elements of successful project delivery missing in the execution of the HSR.
Key delivery standards, including right-of-way permits, utility relocation, and required third party agreements never came together for high‑speed rail, even though the California High‑Speed Rail Authority hired costly consultants, some of whom, such as HNTB, had worked in the past on projects that failed for the same reasons.
Created by the State Legislature and Governor in 1996, the CHSRA was tasked with planning and designing an economically viable high‑speed rail system to support California’s long-term mobility and economic growth. After a decade of research, planning, engineering, environmental and economic review, and legislative debate, the proposed 800-mile high‑speed rail system was ready to move toward construction.
But the project began with a flawed structure and quickly became a bureaucratic nightmare. The largest public construction effort in state history had only ten employees to manage and oversee it. Instead of building in-house engineering and rail expertise, the authority was persuaded to hand this enormous responsibility to consultants. Consultants soon overwhelmed the project, creating the unusual situation in which government employees reported to consultants, who in turn managed other consultants.
The project, once touted as a job creator, saw emerging jobs snatched up by lobbyists, consultant groups, contractors, and manipulators—players who had contributed heavily to campaign funding, expressly for the bond initiative that funded the project.
Even now, when voices demand termination of the project, beneficiaries like unions, contractors and consultants begin again to sing the same song with the governor Newsom leading the band: “The project is creating jobs". However, these jobs do not contribute to economic growth. Consequently, money is lost that could be diverted to productive economic engines, such as affordable housing, clean energy, water desalination, repair of a crumbling infrastructure, and other numerous projects.
Watching the gubernatorial debates, I was disappointed to hear every Democratic candidate mouth a "yes", without a single qualification, when asked whether the HSR should proceed. "It shouldn`t cost us more to get to Modesto than it cost us to get to the moon", said Matt Mahan in a separate interview, but stopped short of saying the project should be reconfigured, fearing the reaction of the unions, forgetting that he is supported by the Tech billionaires of the Silicon Valley and not the California Federation of Labor Unions.
Rays of hope shone a few days ago, however, when X. Becerra said " I`m going to scrap the current configuration, and I`m going to make sure we finish. But we`ve got to do it on budget and on time"
The examples of waste and mismanagement are startling. One consulting firm alone had some 470 employees and hired many other consultants. They were spread across offices in Sacramento, Fresno, and San Francisco.
Additionally, incompetence is in full force. One consulting firm initially estimated annual train ridership at ninety million, assuming 90 percent of motorists would switch to trains. These high calculations supported high revenue projections. After a University of California at Riverside professor reviewed the estimates and identified critical issues, the projections were lowered to twenty-five million—a reduction shockingly described as minor. A state inspector general found that fifty-two miles of track, not yet under construction, will be challenged over agreements to relocate facilities like power lines and water supply. Obviously, if a master schedule had been developed, and updated every six months with transparency, issues relating to utilities would have been resolved.
During Metro’s widening of the 405 freeway, I confronted cost overruns and schedule delays due to poor planning, especially utility relocation. This resulted in Metro’s now addressing utility relocation in a separate contract before main construction.
I have been especially annoyed over the unparallelled status of consultants in the high-speed train project. It is correctly referred as a “consultants-captured” organization. They appear as permanent fixtures, and use office space, computers, servers, and software to manage the project, all considered their property.
Quickly and methodically, the money guzzlers retained must be unloaded. One contractor collected over $40 million for simply parking trailers on the site for one year without performing work, only because the high-speed rail agency awarded the contract without first obtaining possession of the land.
It is important to disclose to the public that the system is no longer a Japanese or European "bullet train", but a mixed system with reduced speeds on freight tracks for long runs and many stations added to gain the favor of the municipalities the train travels though.
Government projects must have government leadership. Critically needed are professionals with strong skills and the ability to motivate, influence, negotiate, and manage experts and consultants. Most certainly, the HSR must update agreements with all major players, modify charters with municipal hierarchies, identifying individuals in charge of each primary function.
The high-speed rail project was the brainchild of Gov. Jerry Brown, received the support of Gov. Peter Wilson and Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger—and does not have to be labeled as Gov. Gavin Newsom’s “white elephant.”, which certainly will be used as ample fodder for attacks in his presidential run. It can be revitalized and sculpted into the dream held by many, a true and fast connection to California’s mega regions, contributing heavily and proudly to economic development and creation of opportunities.
But to achieve project viability, it requires the rigorous application of lessons learned and strong, transparent, dedicated leadership, presently void within the governing board and the executive team.
(Nick Patsaouras is an electrical engineer, civic leader, and a longtime public advocate. He ran for Mayor in 1993 with a focus on rebuilding L.A. through transportation after the 1992 civil unrest. He has served on major public boards, including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Metro, and the Board of Zoning Appeals, helping guide infrastructure and planning policy in Los Angeles. He is the author of the book "The Making of Modern Los Angeles.")
