NICK’S VIEW - One disaster of the Palisades Fire was the destruction of 66 of the 107 units at the Villa De La Paz condominium complex. Now residents face a second disaster. Los Angeles Department of Water and Power infrastructure barriers are preventing them from rebuilding their homes.
This condominium crisis clearly exposes the human cost of bureaucratic dysfunction. More than a routine delay, it was a test of Los Angeles’ systems—and the city failed.
Villa De La Paz is one of the Palisades’ last affordable condominium communities, but now it illustrates the consequences of infrastructure mismanagement.
What took place was a botched emergency‑scale obligation by the city. LADWP failed to anticipate the consequences of relocating a power line. The department’s own construction standards prohibit new buildings within a required clearance zone around overhead electrical infrastructure. Yet, it relocated a power line within that zone. Consequently, rebuilding the condominium is unlawful.
This fundamental planning error should have been caught during internal review. Placing a power line inside a mandatory safety‑clearance zone is absolutely a policy‑scale example of infrastructure mismanagement, not just a technical mistake.
As per news reports, residents describe the situation as chaotic, contradictory, and emotionally exhausting. “I want to go up to that power line and move it myself… so that we can go home,” said Keri White, a fire victim. Homeowner Association President David Greifinger expressed frustration. “We get different answers every time. It’s like being in a maze with no exit.”
Chad Comey, a resident caring for disabled parents, said: “There’s a certain indignity to losing your home… and living displaced without privacy and in a temporary situation that does not meet your accessibility needs.”
To complicate matters at the condominium, a new transformer is needed. The existing transformer, with 1,200 amps of power, was not enough to serve the 107 homeowners, so it cannot be reused. Further, the old transformer location no longer meets mandatory work‑area and access dimensions for pad‑mounted equipment.
Simply put, the building footprint changed, as did alley access. And LADWP’s relocated overhead line altered the clearance geometry. So where does the new transformer pad sit? “Over the course of 16 days in July, we were told four different instructions on where to place our transformer pad. That has led to architectural redesigns every step of the way that our board incurs through our architect," Comey said.
The failure at the heart of this was LADWP’s own mismanagement. Once the utility relocated the overhead line into the mandatory safety‑clearance zone, the condominium could no longer be legally reconnected to the grid using the prior setup.
Residents in Palisades report waiting 3-45 days for LADWP inspections, sometimes over a year for simple electrical connections.
Mayor Karen Bass acknowledged the delays in a recent interview with the Los Angeles Times stating; " The problem that people are experiencing right now is with the DWP. We have over thousand homes that are [ permitted] now and people are moving back. They're ready to move back, but then they can`t get the DWP hookup"
The Villa De La Paz HOA says the complex was "an island of affordable housing" and that owners are losing the ability to sell or avoid foreclosure due to the delays. Residents describe the process as "a maze with no exit".
It does not have to be like this. In the Los Angeles Times on Jan. 23, 2025, I wrote along with Ed McSpedon, former chief engineer of L.A. Metro and the chief executive of Infrastructure Delivery Strategies, that while Los Angeles has a tremendous amount of infrastructure work because of the fires, there is an opportunity present to plan and build infrastructure right.
We insisted that city leaders should set a goal of making Pacific Palisades a global model of planning, resilience and infrastructure against future disasters.
Unfortunately, current analyses do not portray Palisades as a model for post-disaster recovery. Instead, it has become a cautionary example of persistent failures in land-use planning, institutional capacity, community preparedness, and fragmented governance.
From the outset, the fire-rebuilding program was undermined by a fragmented leadership structure. Too many leaders pulled the process in competing directions, leaving the recovery effort mired in confusion. This produced a maze of overlapping authorities, competing priorities, and contradictory instructions. It appeared that all who stepped forward were more interested in leading than in delivering.
The question was posed to Mayor Karen Bass: “Who’s in charge?” The response was quick: “Me, that’s the person that’s in charge.”
I had written in this space (Only a Czar and a Troika Can Guide Los Angeles to Full Recovery After the Ravaging Fires, June,5,2025) at the time that a czar is unlikely to succeed if left to act alone. Immediately under a czar’s direction, a troika would best be instituted—a triumvirate of experts with the time and commitment to manage the involved and complicated recovery.
Experience had taught me that what was needed was a clear-eyed person with gravitas and intensity, with keen insight and sharp judgement, a strong communicator who gets important things done, with strategic thinking born out of a proven background and knowledge. And someone who is politically astute with deserved respect from both the political and community sectors for success in private/public service. Above all, the czar should be willing to make tough decisions regardless of where the chips may fall.
I used the terms ‘czar’ and ‘troika’ not as endorsements of authoritarianism but as metaphors drawn from history to emphasize the unique structure to manage a recovery of the magnitude created by the twin infernos. This structure would not replace democratic governance; it would enhance it by organizing leadership in a way that accelerates results while preserving transparency and public accountability.
I have learned that time can move with a turtle’s pace in a government setting. But for those awaiting solutions to a life severely broken by the devastating fires, time passes swiftly, and the worries multiply.
I have strongly felt, and have so expressed, that the opportunity was there for us to take full advantage of this terrible fire situation by designing and by rapidly building the underground portions of new, next-generation, critical infrastructure. It would have been best if this work were completed before the reconstruction of fire-damaged residential, commercial, and civic buildings began.
I had hoped Los Angeles would have begun rebuilding its infrastructure as soon as the fires were extinguished. Its failure to do so exposed the city’s dysfunctional governance. The recovery stalled not because of technical obstacles, but because of a leadership vacuum.
"We`re very sympathetic to what they're trying to rebuild, and we're not going to be the reason why you can`t build that back", General Manager Dave Hanson, said to ABC7. However, besides sympathy the residents need action and urgency.
The facts are clear: agencies stalled and the lack of unified leadership undermined momentum. Los Angeles did not fail for lack of capacity, but for lack of discipline when decisive action mattered most.
(Nick Patsaouras is an electrical engineer, civic leader, and a longtime public advocate. He ran for Mayor in 1993 with a focus on rebuilding L.A. through transportation after the 1992 civil unrest. He has served on major public boards, including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Metro, and the Board of Zoning Appeals, helping guide infrastructure and planning policy in Los Angeles. He is the author of the book "The Making of Modern Los Angeles.")
