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MY VIEWPOINT - The Los Angeles City Charter serves as the city's constitution, defining government structure and binding rules. It does not exist to offer suggestions or recommendations. Approved by voters, it is obligatory. The Charter makes it clear: no executive inside a department can unilaterally rewrite their own power structure.
But do not tell that to some of the city’s super-department executives who keep on trying to alter LA’s form of government, which is Mayor-Council-Commissions, and not driven by the department chief executive officer.
The latest to try is John Ackerman, the appointed General Manager of Los Angeles World Airports, who is pushing a proposal to greatly increase his authority and limit the oversight of the Board of Airport Commissioners. The proposal, a resolution identified on a single page as “Item 6,” was set for February 19 but removed before the final agenda. There was not a single statement as to the merits, pros and cons for turning some Board jurisdictions and responsibilities to the CEO. It is perplexing why the Board president agreed to place it on the agenda in the first place. From my experience, it was likely pulled due to legal, political, and institutional risks.
Presented as a straightforward technical delegation of authority, the proposal actually had much broader implications. It granted Ackerman the power to create and enforce regulations related to airport property, facilities, and security. Notably, Ackerman would only need to report to the Board twice a year after decisions were made, and his rulings would be difficult to reverse. In other words, it was a charter‑level transfer of power without voter consent.
I have observed numerous instances of executive officer overreach and how such actions are structured. At LAWA, a broad delegation of authority could effectively render a mayor-appointed board primarily ceremonial in function. It would act as a charter amendment without requiring a ballot vote.
The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power tried to create a semi-autonomous operation, claiming complexity justified more independence. With contracting authority, joint powers, and technical expertise, external oversight remained the crucial challenge.
The Port of Los Angeles sought to extend its influence; however, this was primarily driven by path dependency rather than overt assertions of authority. Once a terminal is constructed, established policies become fixed, including commitments to long-term leases and capital investments. The Board of Harbor Commissioners often serves to validate decisions that have already been made by staff and tenants.
LAWA’s attempt was unusually direct—a single Board decision could have shifted the entire power structure. Other departments’ overreaches typically focused on contracts, procedures, or information control.
Ackerman should drop his overreach and focus on fixing real problems. Los Angeles International Airport has experienced a significant decline in passenger numbers since the pandemic, and it has not recovered as quickly as other airports after international travel was disrupted, according to the Los Angeles Times.
While the airport held the position of the third busiest globally in 2019, it now ranks eleventh. Predictions for future ridership are much lower than expected before the pandemic; officials originally forecasted 110 million passengers for 2028, but that number has been revised down to about ninety million.
Public agencies have tried various methods to construct mega infrastructure projects, including Design Bid Build, Design Build, Construction Manager/General Contractor, and Public/ Private Partnership, but all faced budget overruns and delays. For instance, the 405 Hwy widening ($1.6 billion asinine project) that was constructed under the "Design Build" method was 40% over budget and three years late, while the 6th Street Viaduct which was constructed under the "Construction Manager/General Contractor" method was two years behind schedule and $100 million over budget.
For the Automated People Mover (APM), LAWA adopted Public/Private Partnership (P3). However, overruns may exceed $1 billion with a three-year delay. Ongoing leadership and management issues at LAWA have led to unresolved claims, lawsuits over unpaid work, and the possible need to use buses for World Cup visitors in June, because the APM may not operable even by then.
From my experience, key issues stem from incomplete and error-filled documents, not the construction method. It is concerning that agencies overseeing large infrastructure projects have never filed Errors and Omissions Insurance claims. The moral of the story is; Provide the contractor with high-quality set of documents, highly unusual for public projects, and there will not be change orders. Additionally, failed projects often are the result of inexperienced and unqualified project and construction managers.
Additionally, major factor for failed projects is the incestuous culture and symbiosis between the executives of the public agencies and the giant A&E companies. The executives move back and forth concerned for their own self- interests rather the public`s good, operating under the revolving door M.O.
Case in point, the California High-Speed Rail Authority CEO, arrested recently on suspicion of domestic battery, is a former executive of HNTB which presently holds multiple contracts with the Authority.
The contractor for the APM is LINXS, a joint venture. The project's costly delays are due to coordination failures, access problems, and tensions between LAWA and LINXS, including IT network access delays caused by LAWA. Several key tasks controlled by LAWA, such as completing internal airport systems, coordinating with other LAWA contractors and resolving faulty LADWP infrastructure were not finished on time.
It would be revealing if the CEO were to request that LINXS posts the CVs of three APM project leaders with similar multiyear relevant experience.
With such massive challenges that have become detrimental to the city, why is Ackerman wasting his efforts on a power‑grab when he must be focused on delivering the defining people mover and stabilizing the airport’s operational credibility?
It has been my observation that when issues accumulate—such as rising settlements and project delays costing the taxpayers hundreds of millions, along with scheduling setbacks—the GM’s responsibility is to resolve the issues rather than overhaul governance. To update LAX, Ackerman should prioritize completing the people mover, stabilizing the capital program, improving labor relations, and restoring trust with the airport commission.
Whereas L.A. is the host of the 2028 Summer Games, mainstream media are ignoring LAWA`s and other public agencies` lack of urgency and planning due to shortage of experienced "beat" investigative reporters.
The public and political system will judge him on delivery, not on governance theory.
(Nick Patsaouras is an electrical engineer, civic leader, and a longtime public advocate. He ran for Mayor in 1993 with a focus on rebuilding L.A. through transportation after the 1992 civil unrest. He has served on major public boards, including the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, Metro, and the Board of Zoning Appeals, helping guide infrastructure and planning policy in Los Angeles. He is the author of the book "The Making of Modern Los Angeles.")
